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CHRISTIAN V. STATE : AN UNNECESSARY OVERCORRECTION
THREATENS THE LAW OF CRIMINAL ASSAULT
CHRISTOPHER DAHL*
In Christian v. State,1 the Court of Appeals considered whether the
mitigation defenses of imperfect self-defense and hot-blooded response could apply to the statutory crime of first degree assault.2 As
the court had previously decided that first degree assault could serve
as a predicate felony for felony murder,3 the court was compelled to
extend these defenses to first degree assault.4 Otherwise, each felony
assault that resulted in death would be murder, falling under the strict
liability felony murder rule.5 While this conclusion solved the felony
murder dilemma, allowing these defenses for every first degree assault, whether or not that assault resulted in death, is an unnecessary
overcorrection.6 In so holding, the court undermined the doctrinal
underpinnings of homicide mitigation defenses, while at the same
time frustrating the common law deterrence goals and legislative intent behind the assault statute.7 The court should have instead applied the State of Georgia’s “modified merger” approach, which
would correct the felony murder problem without sacrificing these vital interests.8
I.

THE CASE

Christian considered two recent decisions of the Court of Special
Appeals that raised similar issues on appeal.9 In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals held in Christian v. State10 that imCopyright  2009 by Christopher Dahl.
* Christopher Dahl is a second-year law student at the University of Maryland School
of Law and is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review. Special thanks to Professor
Richard Boldt for his initial guidance on Maryland criminal law.
1. 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008).
2. Id. at 309–10, 951 A.2d at 833–34.
3. Roary v. State, 385 Md. 217, 236, 867 A.2d 1095, 1106 (2005).
4. See Christian, 405 Md. at 331, 951 A.2d at 846–47 (noting the concerns raised in
Roary about a future case in which a defense of mitigating circumstances might potentially
be raised).
5. Id., 951 A.2d at 847 (citing and quoting Roary, 385 Md. at 235, 867 A.2d at 1105).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part IV.A–B.
8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. Christian, 405 Md. at 309–10, 951 A.2d at 833–34.
10. No. 74 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 9, 2005), rev’d, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008).
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perfect self-defense could not be used to mitigate statutory first degree
assault to second degree assault.11 Similarly, the Court of Special Appeals held in Stevenson v. State12 that the defense of hot-blooded response could not mitigate a charge of first degree assault.13
A. Christian v. State
Daniel Christian was tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County and found guilty of first degree assault, second degree assault,
and carrying a dangerous and deadly weapon openly with intent to
injure.14 Christian was accused of stabbing Raynard Moulden, who
confronted Christian in a parking lot outside of the Ruby Tuesday
restaurant in Owings Mills after Moulden had begun to suspect that
Christian was romantically involved with Moulden’s girlfriend.15
Moulden claimed that he “nudged” his girlfriend during the confrontation, at which point Christian put him into a “bear hug.”16 According to Christian, however, Moulden “shoved” his girlfriend, and then
ran after a retreating Christian, forcing Christian to stab Moulden to
defend himself.17 Christian stabbed Moulden with a nine-inch blade,
puncturing Moulden’s lung.18 The jury found Christian guilty of first
degree assault, and the court sentenced him to ten years of incarceration for the crime.19
Christian appealed his conviction, claiming, inter alia, that the
trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense to mitigate a first degree assault charge.20 Christian
argued that recent revisions to the assault statute cast into doubt the
11. Id., slip op. at 10.
12. 163 Md. App. 691, 882 A.2d 323 (2005), rev’d sub nom. Christian v. State, 405 Md.
306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008).
13. Id. at 691.
14. Christian, 405 Md. at 310, 951 A.2d at 834. The unreported opinion of the Court of
Special Appeals states that Christian was tried in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County. Christian, No. 74, slip op. at 1. Entering the defendant’s full name into the Maryland Judiciary Case Search website indicates that the Court of Appeals is correct that the
trial court was in Baltimore County. See Maryland Judiciary Case Search, http://
casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquiry-index.jsp (last visited May 20, 2009) (listing
the trial court case as case number “03K02002414” under a search for “Daniel Marquel
Christian).
15. Christian, No. 74, slip op. at 1–4.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id. at 4, 6.
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id.
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rule of Richmond v. State,21 which held that imperfect self-defense does
not apply to aggravated assault.22 In an unreported opinion, the
Court of Special Appeals rejected Christian’s argument, unpersuaded
by his assertion that the recodification of the assault statute called for
a reexamination of Richmond’s holding.23
B. Stevenson v. State
In a separate proceeding, Kalilah Stevenson was tried in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County and found guilty of first degree assault, reckless endangerment, and malicious destruction of property.24
Stevenson was charged with stabbing her husband, Antonio Corbin, in
the arm following a confrontation at Corbin’s mother’s house.25 Stevenson’s and Corbin’s versions of the facts differed significantly,26 but
the allegation at trial was that Stevenson stabbed Corbin twice in the
arm with a butcher knife.27 The trial court found Stevenson guilty
and sentenced her to ten years of incarceration.28
Stevenson appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on hot-blooded response to mutual combat to
mitigate a charge of first degree assault.29 The Court of Special Appeals, this time in a published opinion, rejected Stevenson’s argument
and affirmed the conviction.30 While no Maryland case had directly
addressed whether hot-blooded response to mutual combat could mitigate a charge of first degree assault, the court analogized the inapplicability of imperfect self-defense to that charge.31 Again applying the
21. 330 Md. 223, 623 A.2d 630 (1993), abrogated by Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951
A.2d 832 (2008).
22. Christian, No. 74, slip op. at 6 (citing Richmond, 330 Md. at 227–28, 623 A.2d at
632).
23. Id. at 10.
24. Stevenson v. State, 163 Md. App. 691, 692 & n.1, 882 A.2d 323, 324 & n.1 (2005),
rev’d sub nom. Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008).
25. Id. at 693–94, 882 A.2d at 325.
26. Christian, 405 Md. at 312, 951 A.2d at 835. Corbin claimed that he tried to push
Stevenson out of Corbin’s mother’s house to defuse an argument between Stevenson and
Corbin’s mother. Id. According to Corbin, Stevenson then took a butcher knife from the
kitchen and stabbed him twice in the arm. Id. Stevenson’s version of the events had
Corbin’s mother pulling a gun on Stevenson. Id. When Stevenson pushed the gun away,
according to her story, Corbin attacked her. Id. Stevenson denied stabbing Corbin, instead claiming that she fled the scene, fearing for her life. Id.
27. Stevenson, 163 Md. App. at 694, 882 A.2d at 325.
28. Christian, 405 Md. at 312, 951 A.2d at 835–36.
29. Stevenson, 163 Md. App. at 692, 882 A.2d at 324.
30. Id. at 693, 882 A.2d at 324–25.
31. Id. at 696, 882 A.2d at 326.
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holdings of Richmond and its predecessors,32 the court found that the
trial court did not err in refusing the jury instruction on mitigation.33
The court noted, however, that Stevenson’s request was “neither illogical nor unreasonable,” and recognized that other jurisdictions had
statutorily approved provocation as mitigation for assault charges.34
The opinion seemed to signal the Court of Appeals or the General
Assembly to address this issue.35
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and consolidated the
cases to determine whether imperfect self-defense and hot-blooded
response should be recognized as defenses to a charge of first degree
assault.36
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Christian v. State represents the intersection between two evolving
doctrines in Maryland criminal law: (1) the application of imperfect
defenses to malice-based criminal charges,37 and (2) the development
of the crime of assault following the 1996 statutory re-codification of
that crime.38
32. See, e.g., Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 613 A.2d 379 (1992); State v. Faulkner, 301
Md. 482, 483 A.2d 759 (1984); Bryant v. State, 83 Md. App. 237, 574 A.2d 29 (1990).
33. Stevenson, 163 Md. App. at 693, 882 A.2d at 324–25. The Court of Special Appeals
also rejected Stevenson’s claim that first degree assault was the “functional equivalent” of
the former crime of assault with intent to murder. Id. at 699, 882 A.2d at 328. Indeed,
assault with intent to murder, a “shadow form[ ]” of murder, could be mitigated by such a
defense. Id. at 696–97, 882 A.2d at 326–27. Nevertheless, the court rejected this “functional equivalent” claim, noting the differences between the elements of first degree assault and the former crime of assault with intent to murder. Id. at 699–700, 882 A.2d at
328. The court also refused to reverse Stevenson’s conviction on the basis that refusing to
extend the mitigation defense to first degree assault would lead to an “absurd result,” in
which a person attacking another in hot blood with intent to kill would face a longer
maximum prison sentence if the victim lived than if the victim died. Id. at 700–01, 882
A.2d at 328–29. The court disposed of this argument as well, noting that Maryland does
not find “sentencing incongruities illegal or unconstitutional [unless that] incongruity actually produces” an unfair punishment. Id. at 701, 882 A.2d at 329 (citing Simms v. State,
288 Md. 712, 719–20, 421 A.2d 957, 961 (1980)).
34. Id. at 693 & n.2, 882 A.2d at 324 & n.2 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3202(2)(a)–(b) (West 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.040 (West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.060 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2903.12 (West 2004)).
35. See id. at 693, 882 A.2d at 325 (“If any change is to be made, it must be done by the
Court of Appeals or the legislature. We shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court,
confident that we have not heard the last of this matter.”).
36. Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 309, 311, 313, 951 A.2d 832, 833, 835, 836 (2008).
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. See infra Part II.B.
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A. Hot-Blooded Response and Imperfect Self-Defense Are Historically
Recognized as Mitigation Defenses to Murder and Assault with
Intent to Murder
1. Hot-Blooded Response as Applied to Homicide and Assault with
Intent to Murder
Maryland criminal law recognizes hot-blooded response to legally
adequate provocation as mitigating murder to manslaughter.39 Hotblooded response is a mitigation defense developed under the common law.40 As articulated in Girouard v. State41 in 1990, to be eligible
for mitigation on the basis of hot-blooded response, four elements
must be present.42 First, the provocation must be legally adequate.43
In order to suffice, the provocation must be enough to “inflame the
passion of a reasonable man and tend to cause him to act for the
moment from passion rather than reason.”44 Sufficient acts of provocation include, but are not limited to, discovering one’s spouse in the
act of adultery, mutual combat, or assault and battery.45 Second, the
homicide must have occurred in the heat of passion.46 Third, the
heat of passion must have been sudden and the homicide must have
occurred before the heat of passion reasonably should have cooled.47
Finally, there must be a causal link between the provocation, the heat
of passion, and the homicide.48
39. See Girouard v. State, 321 Md. 532, 538, 583 A.2d 718, 721 (1991) (defining voluntary manslaughter as an intentional homicide, caused by provocation and committed in a
heat of passion).
40. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 191–92 (1769).
41. 321 Md. 532, 583 A.2d 718.
42. Id. at 538–39, 583 A.2d at 721.
43. Id. at 539, 583 A.2d at 721.
44. Id., 583 A.2d at 722 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. at 538, 583 A.2d at 721 (citing State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 486, 483 A.2d 759,
761 (1984)). The Girouard court also recognized the possibility that injury to a relative of
the defendant or to a third party, or “death resulting from resistance of an illegal arrest”
might suffice as legally adequate provocation for a mitigation defense. Id. These defenses
roughly correspond to those available under the English common law: (1) assault and
battery; (2) angry words followed by an assault; (3) witnessing the beating of a friend or
family member; (4) witnessing an unlawful arrest; and (5) witnessing one’s wife in that act
of adultery. A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 293 (1976)
(citing R. v. Mawgridge, (1707) 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1114–15 (Q.B.)).
46. Girouard, 321 Md. at 539, 583 A.2d at 721.
47. Id.; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at 191 (“[I]f there be a sufficient coolingtime for passion to subside and reason to interpose, and the person so provoked afterwards
kills the other, this is deliberate revenge and not heat of blood, and accordingly amounts
to murder.”).
48. Girouard, 321 Md. at 539, 583 A.2d at 721.
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Maryland courts have limited this defense to the crime of homicide and its shadow forms.49 Three of the four elements of the defense, in fact, are couched in terms of homicide.50 The Court of
Appeals expressed in Richmond v. State,51 in dicta, the non-applicability
of hot-blooded response to crimes other than homicide.52 Like imperfect self-defense, hot-blooded response only mitigates the species
of malice in murder crimes.53
2. Imperfect Self-Defense as Applied to Murder and Assault with
Intent to Murder
Unlike the hot-blooded response mitigation defense, which
originated in the English common law, imperfect self-defense is a relatively new mitigation theory, emerging only in the late nineteenth
century.54 After a series of cases that explored, but did not fully
adopt, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense as a means to mitigate
murder to manslaughter,55 the Court of Appeals expressly accepted
the doctrine in State v. Faulkner,56 allowing it to mitigate both murder
and assault with intent to murder.57
In 1975, a series of Maryland cases considered the impact of the
Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur,58
which held that it was constitutionally impermissible for a state to
place upon a defendant the burden to prove that he acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation in order to escape conviction for
murder.59 This decision set the stage for a close consideration of the
49. Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 232–33, 623 A.2d 630, 634–35 (1993), abrogated by
Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008).
50. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text; see also Stevenson v. State, 163 Md.
App. 691, 695, 882 A.2d 323, 326 (2005), rev’d sub nom. Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951
A.2d 832 (2008) (emphasizing that the second, third, and fourth elements of this rule all
reference homicide, thereby rejecting its application to non-homicide crimes).
51. 330 Md. 223, 623 A.2d 630.
52. See id. at 232, 623 A.2d at 634.
53. Id.
54. See State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 488–89, 483 A.2d 759, 762–63 (1984) (citing
Reed v. State, 11 Tex. Ct. App. 509 (1882), as the earliest application of imperfect selfdefense). The Reed court permitted imperfect self-defense to mitigate murder to manslaughter where the defendant wrongly placed himself in a position where he later needed
to take the life of another to save his own life. Id.
55. See infra notes 58–69 and accompanying text.
56. 301 Md. 482, 483 A.2d 759.
57. Id. at 499–505, 483 A.2d at 768–71.
58. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
59. Id. at 704. Because Fourteenth Amendment Due Process requires that a prosecutor
prove every element of a crime, and absence of provocation is an element of malice aforethought, the burden must be on the prosecutor to prove the absence of provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 703–04.
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applicability of mitigation defenses in Maryland criminal law.60 The
Court of Special Appeals quickly applied the Mullaney constitutional
standard to Maryland law in Evans v. State,61 holding that it would be
unconstitutional to require a defendant to prove the absence of any
element of a crime.62 In a footnote, the Evans court first considered
the possibility of mitigation by imperfect self-defense, but qualified
that it was “little more than an academic possibility.”63 In Shuck v.
State,64 decided only one day after Evans, the Court of Special Appeals
reversed and remanded for a new trial a conviction for second degree
murder and assault with intent to murder on the basis that the trial
court failed to instruct the jury on mitigation, including imperfect
self-defense as applied to an act in defense of another.65 Three days
later, in Wentworth v. State,66 the Court of Special Appeals reversed and
remanded for a new trial a conviction for second degree murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery on the basis of imperfect duress.67 Finally, at the end of 1975, the court in Law v. State68 applied the
imperfect defense of habitation to a conviction for second degree
murder and assault with intent to murder.69
In 1984, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari in Faulkner to
determine whether imperfect self-defense could mitigate a charge of
assault with intent to murder.70 The Court of Appeals examined the
three forms of imperfect self-defense employed by other jurisdictions:
(1) where the defendant acted reasonably but had been the initial
provocateur;71 (2) where the defendant used an unreasonable
amount of force to defend himself;72 and (3) where the defendant
acted under an “honest but unreasonable belief that he was about to
suffer death or serious bodily harm.”73 The court accepted the third,
60. For a more complete discussion of the arc of Maryland cases following Mullaney v.
Wilbur, see CHARLES E. MOYLAN JR., CRIMINAL HOMICIDE LAW § 10.1 (2002).
61. 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff’d, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976).
62. Id. at 730–31, 349 A.2d at 354.
63. Id. at 658 n.4, 349 A.2d at 314 n.4 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR.,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 77, at 583 (1972)).
64. 29 Md. App. 33, 349 A.2d 378 (1975).
65. Id. at 34, 43–44, 349 A.2d at 379, 383–84.
66. 29 Md. App. 110, 349 A.2d 421 (1975).
67. Id. at 111, 121, 349 A.2d at 423, 428.
68. 29 Md. App. 457, 349 A.2d 295 (1975).
69. Id. at 459, 462, 349 A.2d at 296, 298.
70. State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 484, 483 A.2d 759, 760 (1984).
71. Id. at 489, 483 A.2d at 763 (citing Allison v. State, 86 S.W. 409, 414 (Ark. 1904)
(dictum); Reed v. State, 11 Tex. Ct. App. 509, 518–19 (1882); State v. Flory, 276 P. 458,
465–66 (Wyo. 1929) (dictum)).
72. Id. (citing State v. Clark, 77 P. 287, 290 (Kan. 1904)).
73. Id. (citing Allison, 86 S.W. at 414); State v. Thomas, 114 S.E. 834, 837 (N.C. 1922)).
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“unreasonable belief,” form of the defense.74 The court reasoned that
“a defendant who commits a homicide while honestly, though unreasonably, believing” that force was necessary does not act with malice,
and thus, his or her crime should be reduced to voluntary manslaughter.75 Likewise, because the malice element of murder is identical to
the intent element of assault with intent to murder, the court held
that imperfect self-defense would also mitigate that crime to simple
assault.76
Maryland courts drew a sharp line at the edge of its holding in
Faulkner, subsequently limiting applicability of the doctrine to homicide and shadow forms of homicide like assault with intent to murder.77 The Court of Appeals crystallized the inapplicability of
imperfect self-defense to non-homicide crimes in Richmond, in which a
criminal defendant appealed a conviction of malicious wounding with
intent to disable, claiming that the jury should have been instructed
on imperfect self-defense.78 The court granted that something like
imperfect self-defense might act to negate an element of a specific
intent crime.79 Imperfect self-defense could not, however, negate the
“malice” of “malicious wounding with intent to disable.”80 Malice, the
court explained, is a “chameleonic term” that has different meanings
in different areas of the law.81 Thus, the court concluded that imperfect self-defense may only negate the homicide-species of malice and
therefore was inapplicable to the defendant’s conviction.82
74. Id. at 500, 483 A.2d at 769.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 504, 483 A.2d at 771.
77. See, e.g., Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 106 & n.3, 613 A.2d 379, 384 & n.3 (1992)
(refusing to extend Faulkner’s already “generous expansion of the law of self-defense” to
“unlawful shooting with intent to disable, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony,
and battery” (citing Faulkner, 301 Md. at 505, 483 A.2d at 771)); Bryant v. State, 83 Md.
App. 237, 245, 574 A.2d 29, 33 (1990) (“With respect to all other [non-homicide] crimes,
the defendant is either guilty or not guilty. He either acted in self-defense or he did not.
There is no ‘in between.’”).
78. Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 227, 623 A.2d 630, 632 (1993), abrogated by Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008).
79. See id. at 233–34, 623 A.2d at 635. If a jury were to find an honest but unreasonable
belief that conflicted with the intent of the crime, the defendant would be fully exonerated. Id. at 234, 623 A.2d at 635. The court urged that this must be understood as a
separate concept from mitigation. Id.
80. Id. at 230–31, 623 A.2d at 633–34.
81. Id. at 231, 623 A.2d at 634.
82. Id. The court discussed the historical reasons for this limitation. See id. at 231–32,
623 A.2d at 634. In English law, courts had sentencing discretion for non-homicide crimes,
but for murder the sentence was always death. Id. (citing LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 63,
§ 76, at 582). Allowing mitigation defenses to reduce murder to manslaughter was meant
to ameliorate this harsh rule. Id.
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B. The General Assembly’s 1996 Revisions to Statutory Assault
Simplified the Law of Assault and Battery, but Challenged the
Courts to Integrate the New Law into the Common Law
Scheme
1. 1996 Revisions to the Assault Statute
Before 1996, the law of assault and battery in Maryland was a
patchwork of statutes and common law versions of the crime. Historically, Maryland recognized the common law crime of assault and the
closely related common law crime of battery.83 Battery, at common
law, included “any unlawful force used against the person of another,
no matter how slight.”84 Maryland common law additionally recognized two forms of assault: (1) “‘attempt[ing] to commit a battery,’”
and (2) “‘intentional[ly] placing . . . another in apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.’”85 “Assault and battery” could either
refer to two separate crimes or simply to the crime of battery.86
The Maryland General Assembly first modified the common law
crimes of assault and battery in 1853 by enacting the first aggravated
assault statute.87 Over the next century and a half, the legislature
modified this statute and added additional categories, defining specific penalties for each.88 By the 1990s, the law of assault was spread
across the Criminal Law Article and more than a century of case law.
In 1996, the General Assembly significantly simplified the Maryland law of criminal assault, repealing the former statutory forms of
83. Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 700, 625 A.2d 984, 992 (1993).
84. Kellum v. State, 223 Md. 80, 85, 162 A.2d 473, 476 (1960).
85. Dixon v. State, 302 Md. 447, 457, 488 A.2d 962, 966 (1985) (quoting ROLLIN M.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 114 (2d ed. 1969)).
86. State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 503, 510, 510 A.2d 253, 256–57 (1986).
87. MD. CODE art. 27, § 189 (1888).
If any person shall unlawfully shoot at any person, or shall in any manner unlawfully and maliciously attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person,
or shall unlawfully and maliciously stab, cut, or wound any person, or shall assault
and beat any person, with intent to maim, disfigure or disable such person, or
with intent to prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any party for any
offence for which the said party may be legally apprehended or detained, every
such offender, and every person counselling, aiding or abetting such offender,
shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by confinement in the penitentiary
for a period not less than eighteen months and not more than ten years.
Id. This early statute contained many of the hallmarks of Maryland’s subsequent aggravated assault statutes, including application to assaults with intent to commit serious bodily
injuries or involving the use of a firearm, and limiting a court’s sentencing discretion to
ensure a harsh penalty. Cf. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-202 (LexisNexis 2002) (integrating the first two of these elements, though not setting a minimum penalty for first
degree assault).
88. See infra note 97.
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assault and consolidating them into a two-tiered assault statute.89 This
consolidation roughly tracked the recommended text of section 211.1
of the Model Penal Code, which suggested simplifying the common
law of assault and battery and sprawling statutory varieties into one
integrated statute.90 “Assault,” under these revisions, included the
crimes judicially recognized as assault, battery, and assault and battery.91 A person who committed any of these judicially recognized
crimes would be guilty, at minimum, of the misdemeanor of second
degree assault.92 Conviction for second degree assault carries a fine of
up to $2,500 or incarceration for up to ten years, or both.93 If, however, a person commits any form of assault (a) with the intent to cause
“serious physical injury” to another94 or (b) with a firearm, then that
person is guilty of first degree assault.95 First degree assault is a felony
punishable by up to twenty-five years of imprisonment.96 This penalty
represents a substantial increase from the maximum penalties for serious assault crimes under the former statute, which carried maximum
prison terms of fifteen years.97
In addition to consolidating the numerous forms of assault and
battery into a two-tiered statutory scheme, the statute also offered ad89. 1996 Md. Laws 3616–20.
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 & cmt.2 (1962).
91. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-201 (LexisNexis 2002).
92. Id. § 3-203.
93. Id. § 3-203(b).
94. Id. § 3-202. The 1996 statute defines “serious physical injury” as “physical injury
that creates a substantial risk of death or causes permanent or protracted serious: disfigurement, loss of . . . or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Id. § 3201. This definition strongly resembles the definition given in the Model Penal Code, “bodily
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3). The General Assembly modified this definition
slightly in the Maryland assault statute, adding “protracted” to refer to disfigurement and
“permanent” to refer to loss or impairment. See 1996 Md. Laws 3619.
95. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-202.
96. Id. § 3-202(b).
97. Assault with intent to rob under the former statute carried a maximum of ten years.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12 (1992). Assault with intent to rape was punishable by up to
fifteen years. Id. The crime of mayhem carried a maximum sentence of ten years. Id.
§ 384. Malicious injury to tongue, nose, eye, lip, and limb with intent to disfigure carried a
maximum sentence of fifteen years. Id. § 385. Unlawful shooting, stabbing, and assaulting
with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable or to prevent lawful apprehension was punishable
by up to fifteen years. Id. § 386. The 1996 first degree assault statute exceeded each of
these by at least ten years. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. While the pre-1996
crime of assault with intent to commit murder carried a greater penalty of up to thirty years,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12, this probably better corresponds with the 1996 attempted
murder statute, which punished an attempt to commit second degree murder by up to
thirty years and an attempt to commit first degree murder by up to a life sentence. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 411A (1996).
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ditional elements that clarified the prosecutorial function and available defenses.98 The amended statute included a “charging
documents” section that offered prosecutors a boilerplate charging
document that clarified how offenses under the section interrelate.99
The statute also included a section that ensured that “[a] person
charged with an offense under this subheading is entitled to assert any
judicially recognized defense.”100 This provision replaced the former
section 12A, which made available a defense for any person intervening in the assault of another.101 The committee notes indicate that
this revision was intended to ensure that the repeal of the former section 12A was not understood as a repeal of the defense available
under former section 12A, nor an abrogation of the extension of this
defense recognized by the Court of Special Appeals in Alexander v.
State102 to individuals who reasonably believed that another was being
assaulted.103
The two-tiered assault statute now embodies all of the law of assault in Maryland. The 1996 amendments expressly repealed all other
statutory forms of assault.104 Further, just as the Court of Appeals determined in West v. State105 that the 1987 consolidated theft statute
subsumed common law larceny,106 it held in Robinson v. State107 that
the 1996 assault statute subsumed and abrogated the former common
law crimes of assault, battery, and assault and battery.108 The once
98. See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
99. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12A-4 (1996).
100. Id. § 12A-3.
101. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12A (1992) (“Any person witnessing a violent assault
upon the person of another may lawfully aid the person being assaulted by assisting in that
person’s defense. The force exerted upon the attacker or attackers by the person witnessing the assault may be that degree of force which the assaulted person is allowed to assert
in defending himself.”).
102. 52 Md. App. 171, 447 A.2d 880 (1982).
103. 1996 Md. Laws 3621.
104. 1996 Md. Laws 3616–17. The statute specifically eliminated the former statutory
crimes of assault with intent to murder, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 12 (1992); assault with
intent to ravish, id.; assault with intent to rob, id.; reckless endangerment, id. § 120; mayhem, id. § 384; tarring and feathering, id.; malicious injury to tongue, nose, eye, lip, limb,
etc., id. § 385; and unlawful shooting, stabbing, or assaulting with intent to maim, disfigure,
or disable or to prevent lawful apprehension, id. § 386.
105. 312 Md. 197, 539 A.2d 231 (1988).
106. Id. at 202–03 n.1, 539 A.2d at 233 n.1 (citing Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116, 124–26, 532
A.2d 1357, 1360–61 (1987)).
107. 353 Md. 683, 728 A.2d 698 (1999).
108. Id. at 700–01, 728 A.2d at 706. The procedural history of Robinson offers a picture
of the complex challenges prosecutors faced under the pre-1996 assault scheme. See supra
notes 98–103 and accompanying text. The defendant in Robinson was charged with both
second degree assault under the 1996 statue and common law assault for a sexual offense
upon a seven-year-old girl. Id. at 687, 728 A.2d at 699. After the State made its case, the
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complex web of statutory and common law forms of violent crime to
the person was reduced to a two-category system.
2.

In 2005, the Court of Appeals Considered the Relationship
Between Statutory Assault and the Common Law Scheme,
Holding that First Degree Assault Qualified as a
Predicate Felony for Felony Murder

The 1996 amendments presented a puzzle for Maryland courts in
their consideration of its relationship to the felony murder rule. Maryland statutory law recognizes twelve felonies that may serve as predicate felonies for first degree felony murder,109 but Maryland common
law permits additional felonies to qualify as predicate felonies for
common law felony murder.110
The Court of Appeals provided the framework for deciding if a
felony qualifies as a predicate felony for common law felony murder
in Fisher v. State.111 In Fisher, the court addressed whether any felonies
other than those in the statute might qualify.112 The Fisher court rejected the notion that enumerated felonies in the statute were the
only predicate felonies recognized under Maryland law.113 The court
determined that the felony murder statute, enacted by the General
Assembly in 1809, was not meant to create new crimes nor eliminate
existing crimes, but only to divide murder into degrees.114 While the
statute laid out felonies that could support a first degree felony murdefendant’s counsel argued that these charges were duplicitous. Id. at 688, 728 A.2d at
700. The state prosecutor elected to enter the statutory crime as nolle prosequi and proceed
with the common law assault charge. Id. at 689, 728 A.2d at 701. On appeal, the defendant’s conviction for common law assault was reversed when the Court of Appeals determined that common law assault was no longer a crime after the 1996 revisions to the
assault statute. Id. at 704–05, 728 A.2d at 708.
109. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2002) (arson, barn-burning,
burglary, carjacking, escape from prison, kidnapping, mayhem, rape, robbery, sexual offense, sodomy, and manufacture or possession of a destructive device).
110. Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 250–51, 786 A.2d 706, 725–26 (2001) (citing Evans v.
State, 28 Md. App. 640, 686 n.23, 349 A.2d 300, 329–30 n.23 (1975), aff’d, 278 Md. 197, 362
A.2d 629 (1976)). Common law felony murder is second degree murder. See MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-204(a).
111. 367 Md. 218, 786 A.2d 706.
112. Id. at 225, 786 A.2d at 710. At the time that Fisher was decided, only eleven of the
current twelve felonies were recognized for the purposes of statutory felony murder. See
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 408–410 (1996). The current statute, codified at MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2002), includes each of the qualifying felonies
enumerated in the 1996 code, but also includes manufacture or possession of a destructive
device. Id.
113. Fisher, 367 Md. at 251, 786 A.2d at 726.
114. Id. at 249, 786 A.2d at 725 (quoting Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 137, 482 A.2d 474,
481 (1984)).
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der conviction, common law second degree felony murder remained
a cognizable crime.115 The court further rejected the petitioner’s arguments that felony murder was limited to those felonies recognized
at common law,116 or to those felonies which, considered in the abstract rather than the circumstances of the particular case, would be
dangerous to human life.117 Noting that one of the primary purposes
of the felony rule is to deter conduct that is dangerous to human
life,118 the court held that a felony dangerous to human life either by
the nature of the crime or under the particular circumstances in
which it was committed would qualify for common law second degree
felony murder.119 Applied to Fisher, in which the defendants were
convicted of second degree felony murder on the basis of child abuse
under particularly horrifying facts,120 the court upheld the
convictions.121
In Roary v. State,122 the Court of Appeals, applying Fisher’s “dangerous to human life” rule as a baseline, declared that first degree
assault could serve as a predicate felony for common law second degree felony murder.123 Roary presented an interesting problem: Applying the straight holding of Fisher, first degree assault would
certainly meet the standard of a crime dangerous to human life.124
To commit first degree assault, by definition, is to intentionally cause
or attempt to cause “serious physical injury” to another.125 “Serious
physical injury,” which the statute defines as creating “substantial risk
of death”126 or causing “permanent or protracted serious (i) disfigurement; (ii) loss of the function of any bodily member or organ; or (iii)
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ,”127 would
meet the Fisher threshold in the abstract.128 Under this reasoning,
115. See supra note 110.
116. See id. at 251–54, 786 A.2d at 726–27.
117. See id. at 254–63, 786 A.2d at 727–33.
118. Id. at 262, 786 A.2d at 732.
119. Id. at 263, 786 A.2d at 733.
120. See id. at 226–36, 786 A.2d 711–17 (describing, in graphic terms, the ritual abuse of
two young girls—defendant Mary Utley’s daughters and defendant Rose Mary Fisher’s sisters—resulting in the death by dehydration and malnutrition of one of the two victims,
nine-year-old Rita Fisher).
121. Id. at 263, 282, 786 A.2d at 733, 744.
122. 385 Md. 217, 867 A.2d 1095 (2005).
123. Id. at 236, 867 A.2d at 1106.
124. Id. at 230, 867 A.2d at 1102.
125. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-202(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2002).
126. Id. § 3-201(c)(1).
127. Id. § 3-201(c)(2).
128. Roary, 385 Md. at 230, 867 A.2d at 1102.
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however, murder would effectively become a strict liability crime.129
Because conceivably every murder would meet the requirements of
first degree assault, the State would no longer need to prove intent in
order to secure a conviction.130
The petitioner in Roary urged the court to adopt the “merger”
approach applied by other state courts and hold that assault could not
supply the predicate felony for felony murder.131 The Court of Appeals declined.132 The court’s reasoning was couched in the deterrence principle advocated by Fisher.133 The court determined that
retaining the rule was necessary to deter the perpetration of dangerous felonies.134
The Court of Appeals noted, in dicta, the approach taken by the
Supreme Court of Georgia in Edge v. State,135 in which the court addressed the effect of applying aggravated assault to felony murder on
the availability of mitigation defenses.136 Georgia’s high court discussed the unfairness of “bootstrapping” an assault charge to support
a felony murder conviction for a crime that would otherwise be mitigated to manslaughter.137 While rejecting adoption of the merger
doctrine, the Supreme Court of Georgia chose to apply a modified
merger rule.138 Under the Edge rule, a court must instruct the jury on
both felony murder with aggravated assault as the underlying felony
and also on malice murder.139 If the jury finds that malice murder
has been mitigated to manslaughter, then it may not find the defendant guilty of felony murder.140
As Roary did not raise the issue of mitigation, the Court of Appeals saved consideration of that issue for another day.141

129. See id. at 235, 867 A.2d at 1105 (quoting State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 114 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2000)).
130. See id.
131. Id. at 232, 867 A.2d at 1103.
132. Id. at 236, 867 A.2d at 1106.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 414 S.E.2d 463 (Ga. 1992).
136. Roary, 385 Md. at 235, 867 A.2d at 1105 (citing Edge, 414 S.E.2d at 465).
137. Id.
138. Edge, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
139. Id. at 465–66.
140. Id. at 466.
141. Roary, 385 Md. at 235, 867 A.2d at 1105.
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Christian v. State, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
the consolidated decisions of the Court of Special Appeals.142 While
the Richmond v. State rule established that defenses of imperfect selfdefense and hot-blooded response applied only to homicide and its
shadow forms,143 Richmond pre-dated the 1996 statute so the case at
bar posed an open question.144 Applying the Roary v. State rule that
first degree assault could serve as the predicate felony for felony murder, the court held that first degree assault could be considered a
shadow form of homicide under certain circumstances and was therefore subject to the same mitigation defenses.145
The majority approached this question by applying the rationale
of earlier assault decisions to the conditions created under the new
statute.146 The court pointed to pre-1996 opinions that had held that
imperfect self-defense mitigated the former crime of assault with intent to murder147 and that hot-blooded response might also mitigate
the same crime.148 In those cases, the court recognized, the defenses
were available because the malice element of assault with intent to
murder was the same as the malice element of murder.149 While the
court noted its refusal to extend the mitigation defenses to other assault crimes in Richmond, it reasoned that Roary’s application of first
degree assault to second degree felony murder allowed the court to
reconsider that rule.150
Roary presented a problem for the court’s continued application
of the rule of Richmond. The court considered that because first degree assault could not be mitigated, a defendant charged with felony
murder in which first degree assault was the predicate felony would
not be able to present mitigation defenses as he or she could if
charged with intent-to-kill murder.151 As a result, the court recog142. Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 333, 951 A.2d 832, 848 (2008).
143. Id. at 322, 951 A.2d at 841 (citing Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 232–33, 623
A.2d 630, 634–35 (1993), abrogated by Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008)).
144. Id. at 328, 951 A.2d at 845.
145. Id. at 332–33, 951 A.2d at 847–48.
146. Id. at 329, 951 A.2d at 845.
147. Id., 951 A.2d at 845–46 (citing State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 500, 483 A.2d 759,
769 (1984)).
148. Id., 951 A.2d at 845 (citing Webb v. State, 201 Md. 158, 162, 93 A.2d 80, 82 (1952)).
149. See id., 951 A.2d at 845–46.
150. See id. at 330, 951 A.2d at 846.
151. See id. at 331, 951 A.2d at 846–47 (citing Roary v. State, 385 Md. 217, 235, 867 A.2d
1095, 1105 (2005)).
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nized, any felony assault that ended in the victim’s death would be
murder, potentially outmoding all lesser homicide crimes.152
The Court of Appeals chose to use Christian as an opportunity to
resolve this problem, even though neither petitioner had been
charged with felony murder.153 Because felony murder operates to
transfer the underlying felony to supplant the malice element of murder, the court reasoned that a mitigation defense that normally negates malice should also, under certain circumstances, mitigate a
qualifying predicate felony.154 As such, in light of Roary’s extension of
the felony murder rule to first degree assault, the court decided that
“first degree assault [could now] be considered, under certain circumstances, a shadow form of homicide in Maryland.”155 Recognizing
that the Richmond rule was “no longer viable,” the court held mitigation defenses to be available for first degree assault.156
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bell agreed with the majority’s conclusion, but instead based his decision on the rule of lenity.157
The rule of lenity dictates that any ambiguous language in a criminal
statute “must be interpreted in favor of the [criminal] defendant.”158
This rule usually applies when the court is unsure whether the legislature intended that there be multiple punishments for the same act or
a more severe punishment to apply to a particular case.159
Relying upon a committee note corresponding with the 1996 statute, the State argued that assault with intent to murder had merged
with the crime of attempted murder, and therefore, did not fall within
the purview of the assault statute.160 This argument did not persuade
Chief Judge Bell, as the 1996 statute expressly stated that “assault and
152. Id., 951 A.2d at 847 (citing Roary, 385 Md. at 235, 867 A.2d at 1105).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 332–33, 951 A.2d at 847–48.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 333, 951 A.2d at 848. While the exact language of the holding—“[W]e hold
that the mitigation defenses of hot-blooded response to adequate provocation and imperfect self-defense could apply to mitigate first degree assault where those assaults could now
supply the malice necessary for felony murder if the victim dies”—intimates the court
would only apply these defenses to first degree assaults that result in death, the posture of
the case indicates otherwise. Id. Neither of the victims in Christian died, but the court
applied this new rule to reverse and remand both first degree assault convictions. Id.
157. Id. (Bell, C.J., concurring).
158. Id. at 340, 951 A.2d at 852 (citing State v. Kennedy, 320 Md. 749, 754, 580 A.2d 193,
195 (1990)).
159. Id. (citing Haskins v. State, 171 Md. App. 182, 193–94, 908 A.2d 750, 756–57
(2006); Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95, 149, 882 A.2d 900, 932 (2005)).
160. Id. at 341, 951 A.2d at 853.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR408.txt

2009]

unknown

CHRISTIAN V. STATE

Seq: 17

17-JUN-09

11:46

1003

battery retain[ed] their ‘judicially determined meanings.’”161 Chief
Judge Bell also rejected the State’s application of Williams v. State,162
which held assault with intent to murder to be the same crime as attempted second degree murder for the purposes of merger.163 Chief
Judge Bell decided that this decision was inapplicable because the
merger doctrine had no bearing on legislative intent and because Williams predated the 1996 statute.164 The Chief Judge therefore found
there was ambiguity with regard to where assault with intent to murder fit into the new statutory scheme.165
Applying the rule of lenity, Chief Judge Bell opined that mitigation should be available to all first degree assault crimes under the
1996 statute.166 Were this not the result, he reasoned, a defendant
whose crime would have satisfied the requirements of the former
crime of assault with intent to murder would not be able to apply the
former mitigation defenses.167 He or she would be convicted of first
degree assault and face a significantly harsher penalty.168 Chief Judge
Bell concluded that the rule of lenity does not permit vague statutory
language to lead to such a harsh result.169
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Roary v. State decision, extending the felony murder rule to
include first degree assault, set a stage for many downstream
problems.170 Christian v. State posed the first post-Roary paradox for
the Court of Appeals to unravel: What would become of mitigation
defenses when first degree assault could supply the malice element for
felony murder? While the court’s expansion of provocation defenses
solved the problem at hand—preserving the mitigation defenses—this
approach was a gross overcorrection that overlooked precedent and
161. Id. at 342, 951 A.2d at 853 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-201 (LexisNexis
2002)).
162. 323 Md. 312, 593 A.2d 671 (1991).
163. Christian, 405 Md. at 342, 951 A.2d at 853 (citing Williams, 323 Md. at 319, 593 A.2d
at 674).
164. Id., 951 A.2d at 853–54.
165. Id. at 344, 951 A.2d at 854.
166. Id. at 346, 951 A.2d at 856.
167. Id. at 346–47, 951 A.2d at 856.
168. Id. The maximum sentence for first degree assault is twenty-five years, while second degree assault carries a maximum sentence of ten years. Id.
169. See id.
170. See Marcia J. Simon, Note, An Inappropriate and Unnecessary Expansion of Felony Murder in Maryland, 65 MD. L. REV. 992, 1009–16 (2006) (forecasting Roary’s effects on deterrence of violent crime, disproportionate punishments, and erosion of the intent
requirement in prosecuting murder).
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legislative intent.171 The court should have instead adopted Georgia’s
“modified merger” rule, which would solve the problem at hand without undermining the goals of Maryland’s criminal law.172
A. The Christian Court’s Application of Mitigation Defenses to First
Degree Assault Went Further than Necessary to Correct the
Paradox Created by Roary’s Extension of the Felony
Murder Rule to Statutory First Degree Assault,
Undermining Legislative Intent and the Court’s Own Policy Interests
1. Christian Cannot Be Reconciled with the Doctrinal and Policy
Bases for the Historical Scheme Under Which Mitigation
Defenses Only Applied to Homicide Crimes
By extending mitigation defenses to first degree assault, Christian
defies centuries of common law doctrine and contravenes the deterrence policy that informed Roary.173 The court is unable to explain
this choice doctrinally, as mitigation defenses only applied to homicide at common law.174 Further, by ensuring lighter penalties for the
same crime addressed in Roary, this decision threatens the very interest that the court sought to advance in that decision.175
Mitigation, as historical sources and the State’s jurisprudence
have shown, is a concept limited to the law of homicide.176 The historical purpose of the doctrine was to provide gradations of punishment for the crime of murder, which was punishable only by death in
the English courts.177 While Maryland now provides degrees of homicide by statute, with some sentencing discretion for murder in the second degree and manslaughter,178 the doctrinal theory of mitigation
remains in place.179 Mitigation negates the species of malice—the ex171. See infra Part IV.A–B.
172. See infra Part IV.C.
173. See infra notes 176–182 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 183–189 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 190–204 and accompanying text.
176. Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 231, 623 A.2d 630, 634 (1993), abrogated by Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008).
177. Id.
178. See MD. ANN. CODE, CRIM. LAW §§ 2-101 to -305 (LexisNexis 2002).
179. See Richmond, 330 Md. at 231, 623 A.2d at 634 (citing Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340
n.1, 519 A.2d 735, 736 n.1 (1987)) (“[M]alice means the presence of the required malevolent state of mind coupled with the absence of legally adequate justification, excuse, or
circumstances of mitigation.”); Morris v. State, 33 Md. App. 185, 190, 364 A.2d 588, 590
(1976) (“[M]alice and mitigation due to provocation [can] not coexist.”); cf. Joshua
Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982). Professor Dressler argues that, as the hot blood doctrine was devised
“to avoid the harshness of the . . . death penalty,” the rationale is no longer valid. Id. at
432. Professor Dressler is unsatisfied with the law’s ability to rationalize this defense in

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR408.txt

2009]

unknown

CHRISTIAN V. STATE

Seq: 19

17-JUN-09

11:46

1005

act species of malice—that is a necessary element of murder.180 Because assault was not a felony at common law, the English courts
would not have needed to address the problem addressed in Christian.181 There would have been no concern that a prosecutor could
overcome the malice calculation by applying the underlying assault in
every homicide as a predicate felony for felony murder, because the
misdemeanor of assault could never apply as a predicate felony for
felony murder.182
Christian therefore treats the question of whether first degree assault may be mitigated by homicide defenses as a question wholly
unaddressed by the common law.183 The Christian court reasoned
that because first degree assault could now serve as a predicate felony
for felony murder, “under certain circumstances,” it could be considered “a shadow form of homicide in Maryland.”184 The court’s result,
extending mitigation defenses to every first degree assault, is doctrinally untenable, defying the common law in two ways.
First, were the court’s position correct, then every predicate felony could be considered a shadow form of homicide because any
qualifying felony could supply the malice element of murder under
the felony murder rule. Nowhere in the common law, however, is the
extension of a mitigation defense to crimes other than murder permitted.185 Courts and commentators have, in fact, considered and rejected applying the provocation defense to the closely related

modern times, specifically finding fault with inconsistent standards and provocation’s unsure placement between the theories of justification and excuse. Id. at 432–33, 438–43.
180. See Richmond, 330 Md. at 232–33, 623 A.2d at 634–35 (finding that imperfect selfdefense, and mitigation in general, applies only to homicide and its shadow forms (citing
Bryant v. State, 83 Md. App. 237, 244, 574 A.2d 29, 32 (1990))); see also Dressler, supra note
179, at 447–48. Professor Dressler offers that if provocation is rationalized as a partial
justification, that the victim “asks for it,” then if the potential killer were to control his rage
enough only to strike the victim, this should theoretically serve as a “total” defense to assault and battery. Id. at 448. Because Maryland approaches these defenses not as justification or excuse, but simply as the negation of the specific mens rea of murder, Professor
Dressler would find that they only negate murder and other crimes requiring the same
mens rea, i.e., the shadow crimes of homicide. See id. at 447.
181. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 736 (3d ed. 2000) (“Assault and battery . . .
were common law misdemeanors . . . .”).
182. See id.
183. Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 328, 951 A.2d 832, 845 (2008) (“The question of
whether mitigation defenses apply to the 1996 assault statute is a matter of first impression,
in as much as the statute created a new offense and abrogated the common law offense of
assault and battery.”).
184. Id. at 332–33, 951 A.2d at 847–48.
185. A.J. Ashworth, supra note 45, at 292.
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common law felony of mayhem.186 If mayhem, committed in hot
blood, could not be mitigated in the common law, then neither
should aggravated assault be mitigated. Neither has imperfect selfdefense, in jurisdictions that recognize the theory, been applied to
mayhem.187
Second, the court by its own terms limits its consideration of first
degree assault as a shadow form of homicide to “under certain circumstances.”188 The Christian holding, however, is not so limited,
making these defenses available for all first degree assaults, regardless
of whether the crime ends in a death thus elevating the assault to
“malice” for the purposes of the felony murder rule.189

186. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at 206 (noting that mayhem remains a felony even
“committed upon the highest provocation”); LAFAVE, supra note 181, at 717 (refusing mitigation defenses for a husband who, acting in hot blood, severed the sex organ of his wife’s
lover (citing Sensobaugh v. State, 244 S.W. 379, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922))). Under the
applicable statute in the Sensobaugh case, had the defendant killed his wife’s lover during
the act of adultery, he would have been completely exonerated. Sensobaugh, 244 S.W. at
379. Because he did not kill his wife’s lover, but instead tied him up and severed his penis
with a razor, the defendant could not claim the intent to kill and did not get the protection
of the statute. Id. This holding is particularly notable, in that a jurisdiction that chose to
make this sort of provocation a complete justification, rather than a partial defense, refused to apply that same provocation to mitigate aggravated assault. See id.
187. See People v. Hayes, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 887–88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting
that the malice applicable to mayhem—“to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an
intent to do a wrongful act”—is a species of malice that could be negated by imperfect selfdefense). The defendant in Richmond cited one California case as persuasive authority for
extending imperfect self-defense to non-homicide crimes. Richmond v. State, 330 Md.
223, 233, 623 A.2d 630, 635 (1993) (citing People v. McKelvy, 239 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987)), abrogated by Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008). In McKelvy,
the California Court of Appeal for the First District approved the availability of imperfect
self-defense to mitigate mayhem to a lesser included offense based on the same act.
McKelvy, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 786–87. The Richmond court distinguished McKelvy as applying
imperfect self-defense not to mitigate the “malice” of mayhem the same way that it might
negate murder-malice, but rather applying imperfect self-defense as making the requisite
state of mind of a specific intent crime impossible. Richmond, 330 Md. at 233, 623 A.2d at
635. Later California decisions declined to follow McKelvy. See, e.g., People v. Sekona, 32
Cal. Rptr. 2d 606, 609–10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
188. Christian, 405 Md. at 332, 951 A.2d at 847.
189. Id. at 333, 951 A.2d at 848. Presumably, the court chose not limit the applicability
of this defense to avoid a sentencing anomaly raised by one of the Christian defendants. As
the defendant argued, if a person stabbed another in hot blood and that victim lived, then
the crime would be first degree assault, punishable by twenty-five years imprisonment. Stevenson v. State, 163 Md. App. 691, 700, 882 A.2d 323, 328–29 (2005), rev’d sub nom. Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008). If the victim died, however, then murder
would be mitigated to manslaughter and the punishment would be only ten years. Id. By
making this defense available to all first degree assaults, this anomaly is corrected. The
practicality of this result, however, does not address the doctrinal problem in projecting to
new crimes those defenses only available to murder. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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This result is especially puzzling in that it marks a significant departure from the court’s own established policy of deterring violent
crime.190 If Roary may fairly be considered the decision that sets up
the paradox to be addressed in Christian, it is a paradox motivated by
the deterrence of violent crime.191 By choosing to resolve that paradox in a way that reduces the potential penalty for the same crime addressed in Roary, the court undermines the rationale of the Roary
decision.
Aside from skepticism about the deterrence principle in general,192 at least one commentator has offered that a crime in hot
blood is less likely to be deterred.193 This misunderstands the natures
of both imperfect self-defense and hot-blooded response to adequate
provocation. The criminal acting under the honest but unreasonable
belief that force is necessary is not immune to the deterrent effect of a
criminal sanction.194 If he or she were, then imperfect self-defense
would be a complete, rather than partial justification.195 Nor is the
criminal acting in hot blood so compelled by the act of provocation
that he or she is powerless to resist acting.196 Were this true, the
190. See infra notes 191–204 and accompanying text.
191. See Roary v. State, 385 Md. 217, 236, 867 A.2d 1095, 1106 (2005) (“[T]he better
policy is for the law to provide an additional deterrent to the perpetration of felonies
which, by their nature or the attendant circumstances, create a foreseeable risk of death.”
(citing Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 256, 786 A.2d 706, 728–29 (2001))). But see Simon,
supra note 170, at 1009–11 (arguing that allowing first degree assault to serve as an underlying felony will not deter first degree assault). Simon argues that deterrence should be
directed to the intended harm rather than the unintended result, that a second degree
felony murder conviction only carries a slightly harsher penalty than a first degree assault
conviction, and that empirical research does not support the deterrent effect of the felony
murder rule. Id.
192. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation
of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953–55 (2003)
(exploring the three criteria that must be met for criminal law to deter violators: (1) that
the potential violator knows of the rule; (2) that the potential violator perceives the cost of
the violation is greater than the benefit; and (3) that the potential violator is willing to use
this knowledge at the time of the offense).
193. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 181, at 25 (citing JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND
DETERRENCE 45–46 (1974)) (“Those who commit crimes under emotional stress (such as
murder in the heat of anger) or who have become expert criminals through the training
and practice of many years (such as the professional safebreaker and pickpocket) are less
likely than others to be deterred.”).
194. See id. (“Those [acting in] the heat of anger . . . are less likely than others to be
deterred.” (emphasis added)).
195. See Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic But Critical Assessment
of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 1, 12–15 (1998) (noting that the objective reasonability standard required by the
rule of complete self-defense “is necessarily predicated upon a presumption of free will”).
196. See Dressler, supra note 179, at 466–67 (“[T]he actor’s moral blameworthiness is
found not in his violent response, but in his homicidal violent response. He did not control
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crime could not be deterred and hot-blooded response would also be
treated as a complete excuse.197
This also ignores the more general effect of deterrence on the
public as a whole.198 Even if punishment of violent crimes committed
in hot blood or under the honest but unreasonable belief that violence was necessary is not as easily deterred, punishment of those
crimes has a deterrent effect on potential criminals who might fall
within the general class of violent offenders.199 By imposing this new
prosecutorial hurdle, the Court of Appeals actually threatens both of
the tools that the State employs to deter crime: severity of punishment
and certainty of punishment.200 All citizens pondering violent crime
are less likely to be generally deterred if they do not believe that the
State takes punishing those crimes seriously.201
The court’s purpose in Roary was to place serious penalties on an
act entered into voluntarily with knowledge of the dangerousness of
the crime, with an eye toward deterring that particular crime.202 This

himself as much as he should have, or as much as common experience tells us he could
have, nor as much as the ordinary law-abiding person would have. Thus, his choice-capabilities were partially undermined by severe and understandable, non-blameworthy anger, but
he was not sufficiently in control of his actions so as to merit total acquittal.”).
197. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1962) (“A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.”); see also O.W. HOLMES JR., THE COMMON
LAW 54 (1881) (“The act is not enough by itself. An act, it is true, imports intention in a
certain sense. It is a muscular contraction, and something more. A spasm is not an act.
The contraction of the muscles must be willed.”).
198. See ANDENAES, supra note 193, at 8 (describing the three “general-preventative effects” of punishment: (1) deterrence; (2) strengthening moral inhibitions; and (3) stimulating law-abiding conduct as habit); see also Stanley I. Benn & Richard S. Peters, The
Utilitarian Case for Deterrence, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 96, 97 (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972) (“The strongest
utilitarian case for punishment is that it serves to deter potential offenders by inflicting
suffering on actual ones. On this view, punishment is not the main thing; the technique
works by threat.”).
199. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 3 (1971) (discussing deterrence in its simplest form, as applied to a specific behavior that carries specific
consequences).
200. See ERNST W. PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 16–17 (1953) (discussing the fallacy behind increasing punishments to deter crimes without addressing the
more important factor of improving the likelihood that a given behavior results in
punishment).
201. See ANDENAES, supra note 193, at 19–21 (quoting JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (1863)) (questioning the impact of punishment on general deterrence of sex crimes and murder, but ultimately concluding that
fear of being hanged probably causes some to abstain from committing murder).
202. Roary v. State, 385 Md. 217, 236, 867 A.2d 1095, 1106 (2005).
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is, in fact, the entire purpose of the felony murder rule.203 To follow
Roary’s application of the felony of first degree assault to a conclusion
that lightens the penalty associated with that same crime in cases in
which first degree assault does not result in death is a strange perversion of the deterrence principle.204
2. Christian Similarly Undermines the Legislature’s Intent in Recodifying Maryland’s Assault Statute
While the preamble to the re-codification statute offers few clues
as to legislative intent,205 the plain text of the statute and the notes of
the Committee to Revise Article 27 indicate that the General Assembly
was interested in: (1) simplifying the law of assault,206 (2) ensuring
harsh penalties for serious crimes,207 and (3) maintaining the status
quo on defenses available for assault crimes.208 Christian undermines
all three of these purposes.209
The statute offers several indicators that the General Assembly
was interested in promoting simplicity.210 Condensing several available charges into a two-tiered regime points to simplicity.211 Additionally, the amended statute contained a “charging documents” section,
offering prosecutors a boilerplate document and clarifying the way offenses under that section interrelate.212 Both of these point to the
General Assembly’s interest in promoting administrability and simplifying the prosecutorial function.
Christian’s extension of mitigation defenses to first degree assault
does worse than muddy the prosecutorial waters; it threatens the
State’s ability to secure a felony assault conviction by requiring the
203. See HOLMES, supra note 197, at 58 (“[T]he law [of felony murder] is intelligible as it
stands. The general test of murder is the degree of danger attending the acts under the
known state of facts. If certain acts are regarded as peculiarly dangerous under certain
circumstances, a legislator may make them punishable if done under these circumstances,
although the danger was not generally known.”).
204. Cf. id. at 61. Holmes opined that mitigating murder to manslaughter did not upset
the deterrence principle. Id. The threat of punishment accompanying manslaughter, “a
threat of less than death,” would sufficiently deter violence without excessively punishing
someone acting in hot blood. Id.
205. See 1996 Md. Laws 3616 (setting forth the purpose statement in preamble that is
largely limited to reciting the statute’s headings).
206. See infra notes 210–212 and accompanying text.
207. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
208. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 210–232 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 211–212 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 83–97 and accompanying text.
212. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12A-4 (1996).
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prosecutor to prove a negative.213 If we are to understand that mitigation defenses will operate the same way with first degree assault as they
have with homicide, then the due process requirements established in
Mullaney v. Wilbur and applied to Maryland law in Evans v. State should
also now extend to first degree assault. The prosecutor will have the
burden to show the absence of provocation because the absence of
provocation is now an element of first degree assault. Recognizing
the “heavy burden” in proving the absence of provocation, the Supreme Court of the United States in Mullaney nonetheless refused to
shift the burden of proving that fact to the defendant.214 Extending
this “heavy burden” to the law of assault contravenes the legislature’s
intent to simplify the prosecutorial function.215
This decision also defeats the legislature’s intent to ensure harsh
penalties, or at least to maximize judicial sentencing discretion.216 As
an illustration, consider the facts of Stevenson v. State. Acting in hot
blood, Kalilah Stevenson stabbed her husband twice in the arm with a
butcher knife.217 As a result of this severe wound, he required 126
stitches and lost sensation in his hand.218 Before 1996, if this crime
were tried as statutory mayhem, it would have been punishable by a
prison term of up to ten years.219 If it were tried as malicious injury to
limb, or unlawful stabbing with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable, it
would have been punishable by up to fifteen years.220 Following the
General Assembly’s effort to increase maximum penalties for violent
crime in 1996, however, Stevenson’s maximum statutory penalty
would be significantly increased to twenty-five years.221 Applying hotblooded response to mitigate Stevenson’s conviction to second degree
assault, however, reduces her crime to a misdemeanor punishable by
not more than ten years.222 Rather than increase the penalty, as the
legislature intended, Stevenson’s penalty would be five fewer years than
it could have been before 1996.223 Considering the potential fre213. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701 (1975) (acknowledging the “heavy burden” of proving a negative).
214. Id. at 701 (citing State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 145 (Me. 1971)).
215. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 97.
217. Stevenson v. State, 163 Md. App. 691, 694, 882 A.2d 323, 325 (2005), rev’d sub nom.
Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008).
218. Id.
219. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 384 (1992).
220. Id. §§ 385–386.
221. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12A-1(b) (1996).
222. Id. § 12A(b).
223. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. Granted, if Stevenson’s crimes had occurred before 1996, she could have been charged under common law assault, which had
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quency with which an assault may be accompanied by one of the many
legally adequate forms of provocation,224 the courts may become frustrated with their inability to issue harsher penalties.
Finally, while the General Assembly expressly retained all defenses available to statutory assault as of 1996, it gave no indication
that it foresaw an expansion of this type.225 Instead, the committee
notes following the statutory sections seem to indicate that the General Assembly intended to freeze the defenses available to defend
against a charge of assault, while keeping the definition of assault
open for further interpretation.226
Section 12A-3 states simply, “A person charged with an offence
under this subheading is entitled to assert any judicially recognized
defense.”227 One could interpret the phrase “any judicially recognized defense” as including defenses not recognized as of the 1996
amendments, but to be recognized in the future.228 This approach
would find support in the committee notes following section 12,
which expressly indicated that the statute did not intend to “freeze”
the meanings of “assault,” “battery,” and “assault and battery.”229 The
no maximum penalty except for the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment and Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See
Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712, 714, 421 A.2d 957, 958 (1980). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the Eighth Amendment question as applied to
common law assault in Maryland in Sutton v. State, 886 F.2d 708, 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
There, Sutton was convicted of common law assault for stabbing a man who had lived with
the defendant’s wife a total of five times in the neck and chest, before leaving the man in a
street gutter. Id. at 709. The court held that the fifteen year sentence did not violate the
Eighth Amendment simply because it exceeded certain statutory assault penalties. Id. at
710–13. Instead, the Fourth Circuit recognized that Maryland had refused to set a maximum for common law assault because certain crimes—like Sutton’s—might be more grievous than any category that the legislature could forecast in defining aggravated assault. See
id. at 711. The conviction could only be reversed after applying a separate Eighth Amendment analysis, focusing on the gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty, the
sentences imposed on criminals in the same jurisdiction, and the sentences imposed on
criminals in other jurisdictions. Id. at 712–13 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292
(1983)).
224. Consider, for example, mutual combat. Under Maryland’s homicide law, mutual
combat provides adequate provocation. Whitehead v. State, 9 Md. App. 7, 11, 262 A.2d
316, 319 (1970).
225. See infra notes 227–230 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 231–232 and accompanying text.
227. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12A-3.
228. See Mary L. Moore, Practice Tips: Statutory Assault: The Future in the Context of the Past,
30 MD. B.J. 46, 46 (1997) (interpreting a committee note stating the intent of the legislature in defining assault in terms of its judicially determined meaning as an acknowledgement that the legislature could not foresee the full application of the law of assault).
229. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12 committee note.
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committee envisioned that these terms would continue to be defined
by future case law.230
The committee note following section 12A-3, the section defining
the defenses, contains nothing of this sort.231 Instead, the committee
explains that section 12A-3 is intended to preserve the defenses of the
former section 12A, the judicially recognized defense of Alexander v.
State, and that “all other defenses will also remain unchanged under
this revision.”232 This phrase indicates that the committee intended
to “freeze” the defenses available to an assault defendant. Any new
defense, including those established in Christian, is outside of and
runs counter to the articulated purposes of the General Assembly in
re-codifying the law of assault.
B. The Court Should Have Instead Adopted Georgia’s “Modified
Merger” Rule to Solve the Problems Before the Court Without
Offending the Doctrinal Basis for the Mitigation Rule or
Undermining the State’s Policy Goals
The Court of Appeals, in extending mitigation defenses to first
degree assault in Christian, while creating the new problems outlined
above, did solve the central paradox created by Roary’s extension of
the felony murder rule to first degree assault.233 By allowing imperfect self-defense and hot-blooded response to mitigate felony assault
to misdemeanor assault, the court prevented prosecutors from using
the felony murder rule as a way to secure second degree murder convictions for crimes that would otherwise be mitigated to
manslaughter.234
Extending these mitigation defenses to all first degree assault
charges, however, is an unnecessary overcorrection of the Roary problem. The court instead should have adopted the “modified merger”
rule applied by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Edge v. State. This
intermediate approach would have solved the Christian court’s dilemma without sacrificing the doctrinal integrity of the mitigation
rule, the court’s interest in deterring violent crime, or any of the apparent legislative goals of the 1996 amendments.235 The Edge approach, described below, would not solve the sentencing anomaly
presented by the Stevenson petitioner, but this anomaly is not constitu230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
See
Id.
See
See
See

id. § 12A-3 committee note.
(emphasis added).
supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.
supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.
infra notes 244–262.
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tionally invalid.236 This sentencing irregularity, however, in which a
defendant who assaults his or her victim in hot blood may be subjected to a greater penalty if the victim lives than if the victim dies,
may serve a policy interest in maximizing judicial sentencing
discretion.237
Edge, unlike Christian, involved an actual homicide.238 Jesse Calvin Edge Jr., shot and killed his estranged wife and was convicted of
both voluntary manslaughter and felony murder with aggravated assault serving as the underlying felony.239 While Georgia recognizes
aggravated assault as a qualifying predicate felony for felony murder,240 it refused to permit a felony murder conviction where the jury
had determined that a malice murder charge was mitigated to voluntary manslaughter.241 Under the Edge approach, the jury must be instructed to give adequate consideration to whether malice murder
could be mitigated to manslaughter before considering a felony murder charge.242 This approach prevents the unfair “bootstrapping” of
aggravated assault to secure a felony murder conviction where malice
murder would otherwise be mitigated to manslaughter.243
Edge’s reasoning plays a clever trick with mitigation of malice, one
that the Court of Appeals could have followed to preserve the doctrinal limitation on the application of mitigation strictly to murder malice. “If a jury [charged under the Edge instruction] finds voluntary
manslaughter, it . . . finds the [aggravated] assault was mitigated . . . and committed without the mens rea essential to impute
malice to the killing.”244 Rather than mitigating the felony itself as a
236. See infra notes 263–270 and accompanying text.
237. See infra notes 271–274 and accompanying text.
238. 414 S.E.2d 463, 464 (Ga. 1992).
239. Id.
240. Baker v. State, 225 S.E.2d 269, 271–72 (Ga. 1976). The Baker court refused to
adopt the merger doctrine, which would not allow aggravated assault to serve as the predicate felony for felony murder; the court did so not to deter violent crime, but to address a
gap in Georgia’s statutory law of homicide. Id. Under Georgia law, the only categories for
homicide were malice murder, felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary
manslaughter. Id. at 271. Voluntary manslaughter was limited to passion killings. Id. at
271–72. Involuntary manslaughter was limited to lawful acts committed in an unlawful
manner and misdemeanor manslaughter. Id. at 272. If Georgia were to accept the merger
doctrine, then it would be impossible to convict someone who brought about death as a
result of aggravated assault—but without malice—of any crime, since it would not fit within
the narrow manslaughter definitions. Id. But see Lewis v. State, 396 S.E.2d 212, 213 n.2
(Ga. 1990) (criticizing Baker’s logic and indicating that the solution should have been to
amend the statute).
241. Edge, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
242. Id. at 466.
243. Id. at 465.
244. Id.
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categorical matter, as the Court of Appeals decided was necessary, the
Edge court focused instead on the malice transferred from the aggravated assault to the homicide.245 When a jury finds voluntary manslaughter, “the felony of assault . . . cannot support a felony murder
because there is no malice to be transferred.”246
The Edge approach also serves the deterrence goals emphasized
in Roary but derailed in Christian.247 Assuming that individual and
general deterrence is best promoted by maximizing the availability of
harsh sentences,248 the “modified merger” approach serves this interest by keeping the twenty-five year penalty available for first degree
assault convictions. This significant penalty is certain to give pause to
an individual considering committing a violent crime. Further, it best
encourages the general deterrence of violent crime and promotes habitual law-abiding conduct.249 To the degree that such a harsh result
would seem unjust under the facts of a particular crime, the court may
elect to impose a lighter sentence.250 Indeed, first degree assault carries no statutory minimum.251
The “modified merger” rule would also preserve the three goals
of the legislature in amending the assault statute in 1996: maintaining
the status quo on available defenses, promoting administrability for
courts and prosecutors, and ensuring the availability of harsh penalties for violent crimes.252 No new defenses are presented by the Edge
“modified merger” rule that would not have been present at the time
of the 1996 amendments to the assault statute, so only defenses known
to the legislature at that time will be preserved.253 If section 12A intended to freeze the availability of assault defenses to those recognized as of 1996, the “modified merger” rule will accomplish this goal.
Because the “modified merger” rule does not impact first degree assault unless the assault ends in a death, adopting that rule would not
affect the legislature’s vision as to that crime.254
Georgia’s approach is also in line with the Maryland General Assembly’s apparent intent to promote easy administrability for courts
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
but no
251.
252.
253.
254.

See id.
Id.
See supra notes 190–197 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-202(b) (LexisNexis 2002) (setting a maximum,
minimum, penalty for first degree assault).
Id.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
See supra notes 225–232 and accompanying text.
See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
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and prosecutors.255 While the “modified merger” rule requires “some
precision in the charge to the jury”256 so that the jury could not return
a conviction for felony murder when it finds provocation and heat of
passion, this is a lesser burden on administrability than required by
the Christian holding.257 Additionally, this slightly complicated jury
charge would apply to considerably fewer criminal cases. The Edge
rule only applies in homicide cases, whereas the Christian rule will burden courts and prosecutors in every criminal trial where a defendant
is charged with either homicide or first degree assault.258
Finally, this approach preserves the legislature’s interest in ensuring the availability of harsh sentences for violent crimes. Under Christian’s holding, if Kalilah Stevenson was found to have acted in hot
blood, she could only be punished by a maximum of ten years.259
Under the Georgia “modified merger” rule, however, her crime could
not be mitigated by a hot blood theory.260 A court would have the
discretion to punish her by up to twenty-five years under the first degree assault statute.261 Maryland has traditionally trusted judicial discretion in assigning penalties, recognizing that a legislative sentencing
regime may not be able to foresee categories of heinous crimes.262
The Georgia approach is not a panacea, however; it will not reach
every anomaly created by the Roary holding. One of Kalilah Stevenson’s contentions in her appeal was that refusing to apply mitigation
defenses to first degree assault leads to “an absurd result.”263 As Stevenson argued, if a person acting in hot blood intending to kill attacked a victim and the victim lived, he or she would face a maximum
penalty of twenty-five years for first degree assault.264 If the victim
died, however, then the defense of hot-blooded response would be
activated and that person would face a maximum penalty of only ten
years.265 Under this hypothetical, the greater crime could yield a considerably more lenient sentence. Because Georgia’s “modified
merger” approach would not allow mitigation defenses for first degree
255. See supra notes 210–212 and accompanying text.
256. Edge v. State, 414 S.E.2d 463, 465 (Ga. 1992).
257. See supra notes 213–215 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 155–156, 241 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 240–243 and accompanying text (describing how the “modified
merger” approach only impacts crimes ending in death).
261. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-202(b) (LexisNexis 2002).
262. Sutton v. State, 886 F.2d 708, 710–11 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying Maryland law).
263. Stevenson v. State, 163 Md. App. 691, 700, 882 A.2d 323, 328 (2005), rev’d sub nom.
Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008).
264. Id., 882 A.2d at 329.
265. Id., 882 A.2d at 328–29.
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assault when the victim does not die, this anomaly remains in place
under that approach.266 This anomaly is not an unacceptable outcome, however, for many reasons. First, as the Court of Special Appeals pointed out in Stevenson, sentencing anomalies have been
permitted in the law of assault in the past.267 Common law assault, for
example, had no maximum penalty.268 Before the statutory abrogation of the common law of assault and battery,269 a sentence for common law assault could therefore theoretically exceed the statutory
maximum penalty for a more severe statutory form of assault, provided that the penalty did not exceed constitutional limits.270
Further, from a policy perspective, it is advantageous to retain the
flexibility, even in the hypothetical described above, to sentence the
individual to the full twenty-five years of incarceration. Examining the
constitutionality of Maryland’s former assault framework, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted the wisdom in
retaining the common law of assault with no statutory limits.271 The
legislature retained this flexibility, recognizing that it could not foresee every condition that might make one assault more “grievous and
blameworthy” than another.272 While the construct as understood by
the Fourth Circuit did not survive the 1996 amendments to the assault
statute and consequent abrogation of common law assault, the high
maximum penalty serves the same purpose.273 To the degree that the
two penalties are incongruous, perhaps it is the ten year maximum
penalty for manslaughter—not the twenty-five year maximum penalty
for assault—that is the problem.274
266. See supra notes 240–243 and accompanying text.
267. Stevenson, 163 Md. App. at 700–01, 882 A.2d at 329 (citing Simms v. State, 288 Md.
712, 719–20, 421 A.2d 957, 961 (1980)).
268. Sutton v. State, 886 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1989).
269. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 223.
271. Sutton, 886 F.2d at 711 (quoting Walker v. State, 53 Md. App. 171, 197, 452 A.2d
1234, 1248 (1982)).
272. Id.
273. See supra note 223.
274. Several commentators have pressed for an abandonment of the provocation defense in criminal homicide. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished
Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 33 (1984) (citing Glanville Williams, Provocation
and the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 740, 742) (“I would abolish this hoary distinction and convict all intentional killers of murder. Reasonable people do not kill no matter
how much they are provoked, and even enraged people generally retain the capacity to
control homicidal or any other kind of aggressive or antisocial desires.”). Professor Morse
argues that most defendants truly deserving of excuse for homicide may be exonerated
completely on the basis of irrationality or loss of self-control, while most intentional killers
do not deserve sympathy. Id. at 34. To extend a partial defense past the line of total loss of
control is, however, in Professor Morse’s opinion, to confuse responsibility with sympa-
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V. CONCLUSION
In Christian v. State, the Court of Appeals extended two mitigation
defenses previously only available to homicide, imperfect self-defense
and hot-blooded response, to statutory first degree assault.275 This
holding solved one of the downstream paradoxes of the Roary v. State
decision, which brought first degree assault within the felony murder
rule.276 Christian did so, however, at the expense of preserving the
doctrinal underpinnings of mitigation;277 the court’s stated interest in
deterring violent crime;278 and the legislature’s intent to provide easy
administration, harsh penalties, and consistent defenses to assault
crimes.279 Instead, the court should have looked south, to the State of
thetic notions of culpability. Id. at 35–36. While Morse validates society’s sympathy for
actors that it considers less culpable, like mercy killers, he indicates that these call for
extensions of complete justification defenses, rather than the development of partial defenses. See id. at 35. Addressing the partial excuse of imperfect self-defense, Morse favors
following the Model Penal Code and treating a defendant as having committed negligent or
reckless homicide rather than mitigating murder to manslaughter. Id. at 35 n.120 (citing
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1962)). Contrasting
Professor Morse’s hard-on-crime approach, but reaching the same result, is the argument
taken by some feminist critics for abolishing the provocation defense. See generally JEREMY
HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 186–97 (1992) (arguing that the United Kingdom should abandon the provocation defense and leave the effect of provocation as a
mitigator in sentencing because of, among other reasons, gender bias within the provocation defense); Emily L. Miller, Comment, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender,
and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665 (2001) (advocating for abandoning the provocation defense, in light of its common law origins reinforcing the concept of women as
property, its modern discretionary application allowing juries to reinforce male-dominance
in society, its frequent application to mitigate males killing intimates, and for providing
inadequate protection to women seeking to leave relationships). Finally, at least one critic
has acknowledged utilitarian reasons to eliminate the provocation defense. Professor
Joshua Dressler states:
Perhaps the law ought to take the position that those who kill in rage need to
make greater efforts to learn how to deal more constructively with their anger so
that they don’t lash out violently and kill. Abolition of the provocation defense,
therefore, might send a useful general deterrence message that people should manage their anger and stress before emotions boil over in violence, or they will be
treated the same as those who kill calmly.
Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86
MINN. L. REV. 959, 966 (2002) (emphasis added). Professor Dressler disposes of this argument by concluding that the underlying basis of the provocation doctrine is retribution,
not deterrence. Id. This, however, is not the opinion of the Court of Appeals. See supra
notes 190–204 and accompanying text. If deterrence of violent crime is the paramount
value of Roary and the line of cases informing the Roary decision, then Professor Dressler’s
utilitarian concerns may have merit.
275. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Part IV.A.1.
278. See supra Part IV.A.1.
279. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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Georgia, for a more targeted intermediate solution, which would have
limited activating mitigation defenses to only crimes resulting in the
victim’s death.280

280. See supra Part IV.B.

